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Political Elites in Transition and Unification: 
German Lessons for the Korean Peninsula? 
Lars Vogel & Heinrich Best ∗ 
Abstract: »Politische Eliten in Transformation und Wiedervereinigung: Erfah-
rungen aus Deutschland als Optionen für Korea?«. The following paper investi-
gates the role of political elites in the prelude to and trajectory of German 
transition and re-unification since 1989 and takes it as a point of departure to 
identify experiences transferable to the situation on the Korean peninsula. 
Thereby it builds upon the German experience and contextualises it within the 
international research on elite theory and political transition in order to distin-
guish between general results and those specific to Germany. The structures of 
North and South Korean elites as well as changes in these structures will be an-
alysed in order to identify similarities and differences vis-à-vis developments in 
Germany. Lastly, in light of these underlying conditions some conclusions will 
be drawn concerning potential future developments in North Korea, thereby 
assessing the transferability of German findings as well as their potential for 
generalisation. In methodological terms, this paper is a comparison between 
Germany and Korea, albeit with an asymmetric comparative perspective, in the 
sense that the trajectory of transformation and re-unification is well-known in 
the case of Germany, while considerable uncertainty persists with regard to 
possible scenarios for the Korean peninsula. 
Keywords: Elites, Transformation, Korea, Germany, German Unification, Represen-
tation, Elite Change, Regime Change, National Integration, GDR, East Germany. 
1.  Introduction1 
The theoretical foundation of our contribution is provided by the ‘new elite 
paradigm,’ according to which the establishment of a stable and pacified politi-
cal order always necessitates agreements among elites in which relevant elite 
groups reach an understanding concerning the access to and distribution of 
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1  Findings for Germany are based on the research of the projects A1 and A3 of the Collabora-
tive Research Centre 580 at the Friedrich-Schiller University (Jena) and the Martin-Luther 
University (Halle-Wittenberg) between 2000 and 2012, which investigated the premises, 
structures and consequences of transformation in Germany and Europe since 1989. 
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power in a given or future political system (Higley and Lengyel 2000; Higley 
and Burton 2006). Elite groups are therefore key to the success or failure in 
processes of transition or unification. National unification can only succeed on 
the basis of an integration of perhaps not all, but at least large sections of the 
involved territorial units’ elites, that is, by reinforcing their interest in the estab-
lishment and consolidation of unification. Yet the key insights of the new elite 
paradigm extend even further: Elites can cooperate even in the absence of 
institutions grounded in an underlying consensus provided that such coopera-
tion permits them to pursue their own interests. Such an ‘antagonistic elite 
cooperation’ (Best 2009) could be observed over long periods of German divi-
sion. It resulted in the preservation of a common society in two states during 
the years of division and was thereby key to successful German re-unification 
in 1989-90. The national (re-)integration of East Germany, however, would 
have been equally impossible without the replacement of the communist power 
elite’s top echelon before the collapse of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR), coinciding with the ascent of secondary and functional GDR elites,2 
who received numerous opportunities for inclusion and advancement in eastern 
Germany. This process facilitated the rapid formation of a structurally and 
normatively integrated all-German political elite. Correspondingly, no relevant 
political actor today questions German re-unification, and no particularistic, let 
alone separatist, tendencies can be found. However, this rapid integration of 
elites also engendered a distance on the part of the East German population 
towards democracy and its central actors.  
The theoretical analysis and empirically informed depiction of antagonistic 
elite cooperation up to 1989 will be elaborated in the following (2). Subse-
quently, the development of the social structure of the GDR and later East 
German elite and their paths of recruitment will be examined (3), as the adapt-
ability of the social structure of elites in the East and in the West represents a 
crucial precondition for the successful integration of elites in Germany follow-
ing the exchange of power elites already completed in the GDR. The next sec-
tion then addresses this exchange of elites as well as depicting subsequent elite 
integration and its resulting effects in terms of political representation of the 
population (4). In a next step, the social structure of the GDR and later East 
German elite is compared to that of current North and South Korean elites. This 
allows for an assessment of interests and motives of Korean elites, and those of 
                                                             
2  ‘Elites’ are those collective and individual actors who occupy central leadership positions 
within their respective political and social subsystems. The term ‘functional elites’ includes 
persons who hold leadership positions in the various sub-systems and are thus in a position 
to influence developments concerning society as a whole, while the power elite is charac-
terised by the ability of its members to actually decide on and implement measures that 
affect society as a whole. ‘Secondary elites’ denotes persons who occupy subordinate posi-
tions instead of actual leadership positions, but who have good chances of advancing into a 
top-level position at some point. 
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the North Korean one in particular, in a context wherein reconstructing the 
attitudes of the actors involved is often difficult (5). In the conclusion, we turn 
to possible scenarios of developments resulting from this comparison and the 
theoretical implications of the analysis. 
2.  Antagonistic Elite Cooperation before 1989 
The political elites in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the GDR 
cultivated a particular, because antagonistic, form of cooperation. The term ‘an-
tagonistic cooperation’ was coined by the early American sociologist William 
Sumner and describes a situation in which adversaries pursue their respective 
special interests in a cooperation restricted to certain areas of their relations (Best 
and Vogel 2014). This cooperation is based neither on common values nor on 
close social ties, nor does it require resolution of the conflict at the root of the 
antagonism. Antagonistic cooperation requires, however, mutual trust in adher-
ence to common agreements, as no institutions exist that could enforce them. 
Moreover, both sides must assume that the conflict will not be settled in favour of 
one’s own side in the foreseeable future, be it through military action or any other 
measures that may cause either one of the antagonists to break down. 
The elites of the FRG and GDR, respectively, may well be described as an-
tagonists, because they were representatives of two incompatible political and 
social systems whose relationship ranged from peaceful coexistence to the 
mutually declared will of both sides to pursue a hostile takeover of the other. 
Yet owed to their incorporation into a global confrontation between two power 
blocs, which in fact granted some degree of stability, changes in the situation 
seemed unlikely in the near to medium term. Furthermore, elites in both the 
FRG and GDR shared cultural traits and a common national history, particular-
ly including the experience of World War II and thus an awareness of the dan-
gers threatening Germany should the conflict between East and West escalate. 
Against this backdrop, elites of both states cooperated throughout the country’s 
period of division, right up to the day of re-unification. That said, this relation-
ship was frequently tested, such as during the popular uprising in the GDR in 
1953, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 or the repeated disagreements 
over the status of West Berlin. Outcomes of this cooperation, such as economic 
and financial aid for the GDR in exchange for ‘humanitarian relief’ with re-
spect to intra-German traffic of people, goods and information, were formalised 
in several agreements. The most important of these was the Basic Treaty of 
1972 (Grundlagenvertrag), which entailed the FRG lowering down its claim to 
sole national representation and confirmed the recognition of the GDR as an 
independent state (Block 1986, 1993; Bender 1996). For the GDR elite, this 
represented one of the main goals driving their antagonistic cooperation in the 
first place, namely reinforcing the legitimacy and thus the stability of their own 
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state. Other motives included the prospect of economic support and access to 
western European export markets (Kruse 2005). This economic aspect played 
an increasingly significant role beginning in the 1980s, as part of an attempt to 
deal with mounting trade deficits and the threat of negative credit rating, as 
well as cultivating more independence from the Soviet Union, its economic 
problems and, in particular, its attempts of political reform. For West German 
elites, the desire to influence the GDR’s overall situation aimed at changing it 
(‘change through rapprochement’ (Egon Bahr)),3 as well as the prospect of 
humanitarian relief to soften the material consequences of Germany’s division, 
served as central motives. 
In fact, these intended goals were realised, at least partially. The GDR elite 
received formal recognition of their statehood and access to western European 
export markets, and were simultaneously able to meet creditors’ demands in 
spite of their state’s dire economic and financial situation. The stabilisation 
they desired, however, would only last until 1989: Access to western European 
markets, although certainly earning foreign currency for the GDR, came at the 
price of reduced investment in the maintenance and expansion of domestic 
productive capacities, while efforts to increase independence from the Soviet 
Union resulted mainly in a decrease of Soviet support for the preservation of 
the GDR as an independent state. 
Whether or not the FRG’s elites were able to achieve their goals remains 
open to interpretation, for despite the intended change through rapprochement, 
the GDR’s regime was able to suppress almost all signs of political opposition 
until the spring of 1989. On the other hand, it can be clearly seen that the 
GDR’s abrupt transformation in 1989-90 and subsequent re-unification would 
not have happened in the context of a policy of isolation or containment, and, 
on the other hand, without humanitarian relief, the maintenance of close eco-
nomic ties between East and West Germany, the GDR population’s access to 
West German media or the inclusion of the GDR in the Helsinki Process. 
With regard to the subsequent re-unification, the non-intended and indirect 
effects of elite cooperation deserve special consideration. Elite cooperation 
secured the continuation of family and friendship networks and close economic 
ties between the two German states, ties which in turn contributed to the persis-
tence of elements of a common German society and economic space. It can be 
demonstrated, for example, that the intensity of communication between the 
two German sub-states did not, despite the ongoing separation, decrease around 
the 1970s, but, on the contrary, increased again during the 1980s (see Figure 1). 
Moreover, intra-German patterns of communication tended to resemble those 
                                                             
3  Egon Bahr, one of the architects of the FRG’s foreign policy towards the communist coun-
tries, in particular towards the GDR and the Soviet Union, since the late 1960s (Neue Ost-
politik) used this term first in a speech (15 July 1963) to describe the basic idea of this new 
policy. 
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within a single society rather than those between two distinct societies (Best 
1990 [2008]). Continuing notions of and hopes for national solidarity and 
loyalty preserved re-unification as a quasi-natural political option, even if its 
implementation was conceived as a long-term effort. Consequently, neither the 
vast majority of the East German population nor the elites in both GDR and 
FRG considered the continuation of the GDR as state a serious option in 1989. 
Figure 1: Postal Traffic between the Federal Republic/Berlin (West) and the 
GDR/Berlin (East) 
 
Source: Best (2008 [1990]). 
 
However, antagonistic elite cooperation came to an end in 1989 when a profound 
asymmetry developed between the elites in the FRG and the GDR. In light of the 
mass exodus from the GDR and mass demonstrations within it, and especially 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, West German elites were able to assert 
their position of economic and financial superiority as well as their international 
standing, while GDR elites, confronted with meagre support from the Soviet 
Union and mass protests on the part of the domestic population, became para-
lyzed. West German elites were therefore no longer dealing with an antagonist on 
equal footing. By the time the Berlin Wall fell and re-unification was firmly on 
the agenda, West German elites had every reason to doubt that their erstwhile 
GDR counterparts would remain much longer a useful instrument for influencing 
GDR politics. These doubts were confirmed by the first and last free elections to 
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the GDR parliament, the so-called People’s Chamber (Volkskammer) in 1990, 
which ratified the exchange of elites and allowed a new GDR political elite to 
establish itself sharing a fundamental democratic attitude and desire for national 
re-unification with the West German elite. The relationship between the new 
GDR elites and the old FRG elites, however, was no longer characterised by 
antagonistic cooperation, but instead followed the logic of asymmetric integra-
tion. One crucial premise for that integration of elites in unified Germany, and 
subsequently national integration, were successful under these conditions can be 
found in the structure and recruitment patterns of these new GDR elites, whose 
origins date back to long before 1989. 
3.  Structure of the GDR Elite and Changes to it Prior to 
Re-Unification in 1990 
Primary criteria for the recruitment and subsequent careers of GDR elites up to 
1989 included ideological conformity, loyalty and efficiency (Salheiser 2009). 
However, vertical and horizontal differentiation among the GDR’s power and 
functional elites in terms of patterns of recruitment and career trajectories, that is 
to say, the specific weight of recruitment criteria, corresponded to the respective 
social sub-sector and the level of position in question. Apart from demographic 
characteristics (such as gender and age), the possession of social and cultural 
capital (social networks and educational degrees) proved particularly decisive. 
Until roughly the mid-1960s, an aggressive education and recruitment poli-
cy ensured that elite positions were staffed with persons from working class 
backgrounds who demonstrated loyalty to the regime. This policy served to put 
an end to the ‘bourgeois educational privilege’ and simultaneously helped the 
ruling Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) 
consolidate its power. By the late 1960s, however, these same forms of social 
and cultural capital – and thus of the elite status itself – were increasingly 
passed on through familial inheritance. As a result, opportunities for education, 
power and inclusion for members of the lower ranks of the working class and 
white collar workers diminished significantly. 
Within the central elite circles concentrated in the military and security ap-
paratus, families in which up to four generations were closely linked to the 
state and the party ideologically, biographically and professionally, known as 
‘red dynasties,’ were a typical occurrence (Best 2012). The mid and top-level 
elites in the economy, the sciences, and the health sector often came from the 
educated middle class and commonly exhibited outstanding professional quali-
fications and, sporadically, a ‘relative distance to politics.’ Ultimately, howev-
er, professional and ideological criteria were never fully separated, preventing a 
complete professionalization of elites in the western sense. Until the system’s 
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collapse, the primacy of the SED effectively determined employment choices – 
as it did in all important issues. 
Besides the increasing self-recruitment, holders of elite positions further-
more remained in their offices and functions for very long periods (‘gerontocra-
cy’) and accumulated multiple positions and offices. This blocked the younger 
generation, or secondary elites, who found themselves stuck on standby in sec-
ondary and tertiary leadership positions. Anyone who chose not to join the SED 
was additionally blocked; only rarely did these individuals advance into leader-
ship positions, but instead occupied mid-level leadership posts. 
Conversely, in order to accelerate or secure professional advancement, many 
became members of the SED or one of the bloc parties. These persons need not 
necessarily be classified as system loyalists, although they, similar to the major-
ity of the non-affiliated population, pursued no oppositional agenda either. The 
proportion of active members of the opposition was very low, and were not 
established as a counter-elite. When modernisation bottlenecks and the eco-
nomic crisis intensified in the GDR from the mid-1980s onwards, parts of the 
functional elite (particularly in the fields of economy, science and culture) 
perceived and reflected these developments, but they hardly contributed to the 
peaceful revolution of 1989, as even rank and file, secondary elites were privi-
leged over the rest of the population when it came to consumer goods, housing, 
etc. Although many voiced criticisms privately, the majority ultimately re-
mained loyal to state and party. 
The increasing self-recruitment of the GDR elite, the associated mechanisms 
of recruitment and selection and their sector-specific differentiation had estab-
lished an order of inequality and thus created a high degree of compatibility 
with West German capitalist society. The members of the secondary elites and 
persons whose advance into elite positions was blocked by the long office 
terms of their predecessors were particularly well-positioned to establish them-
selves under the new conditions and opportunity structures due to the social 
and cultural capital they had accumulated in the GDR (Best, Gebauer and Sal-
heiser 2012, 83). 
In the spring of 1989 it was not yet foreseeable that this new general frame-
work would be created so rapidly. One factor contributing to this impression 
was the state’s apparatus of repression, which remained effective into the 
summer of 1989, hindering any oppositional efforts and thus the formation of a 
public, visible opposition. However, following the mass exodus in the summer 
of 1989 and in particular the state’s reluctance to violently suppress the Mon-
day Demonstration in Leipzig on 9 October 1989, the old GDR elites’ threat of 
repression rang increasingly hollow, and now not only oppositional groups but 
the aforementioned ‘blocked’ loyalist generation began to push for changes in 
the GDR as well. The beginning of the transition period was therefore charac-
terised by attempts to introduce reforms in the GDR through compromises 
between the – once blocked, but now upwardly mobile – generation loyal to the 
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system and the opposition at the round tables. Despite a massive retreat of the 
old (political) top-level elites, this phase was marked by a remarkable domi-
nance of the blocked loyalists, who could be found largely among functionaries 
of the SED’s secondary ranks (Derlien 1997). 
Figure 2: Political Experiences in the GDR up to 1989 of Members of the 
German Bundestag (MdB) and the State Parliaments (MdL, MdA) 
(Figures Indicated Chronologically since 1990 in Percent)  
 
Source: Collaborative Research Centre 580 of the German Scientific Foundation, Project A3, 
“Jena Parliamentary Survey“; Offices/Mandates: Minister/Secretary of State before Dec 
1989/Deputy in the Volkskammer before Mar 1990 and offices/mandates at regional (before 
Mar 1990) and/or municipal level (before May 1990). 
Reading aid: 23.3 percent of the eastern German members of the German Bundestag in the 
years 1990-1994 conducted public offices/mandates in the GDR before 1989. 
 
Yet these attempts were overtaken by events on the ground: firstly, by the fall 
of the Berlin Wall on 9 November, and secondly by the politics of the West 
German government, which heavily influenced events in the GDR in anticipa-
tion of re-unification under West German auspices. This perspective severely 
curtailed the advancing SED generation’s scope of action, as well as that of the 
opposition at the round tables. Before the results of the Volkskammer elections 
in March 1990, effectively regarded as a referendum vote on re-unification, any 
kind of substantial policy had become nearly impossible. In this sense, the fall 
of the Wall had already handed over the initiative to the West German political 
elite, who then, following the Volkskammer elections, conclusively determined 
the framework in which the GDR’s transitional elite was permitted to act. The 
post-communist de Maizière government that took office after the Volkskam-
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mer elections in March 1990 then finally broke the continuity with the advanc-
ing second row of SED elites. 
Beyond a handful of exceptions, no members of the former top stratum of 
the GDR elite were among the persons now moving into elite political posi-
tions. In the years up to 1994, only one fifth of former GDR executive person-
nel were able to continue their careers without interruption (Gebauer 2012). 
The new political elite in eastern Germany, however, was only recruited from 
the ranks of the opposition to a small extent – even though it remained dispro-
portionately represented in relation to its share of the total GDR population. 
The new elites emerged primarily from the technical, scientific and medical 
professions as well as from positions of middle management, whose social and 
cultural capital acquired during the GDR era secured them the required social 
connectivity in the new order. Membership in the SED was not in itself an 
obstacle, while having held a higher party function in the GDR certainly was, 
as an exemplary but generalizable analysis of the group of parliamentary depu-
ties demonstrates (see Figure 2). 
Figure 3: Political Experience during the Transition Period of Eastern German 
Members of the German Bundestag (MdB) and the State Parliaments 
(Mdl, MdA) (Indicated Chronologically since 1990 in Percent) 
 
Source: Collaborative Research Centre 580 of the German Scientific Foundation, Project A3, 
“Jena Parliamentary Survey.“ 
Experiences: Minister/Secretary of State after Dec 1989/Deputy in the Volkskammer after Mar 
1990/Member of a civic movement at national or subnational level/regional and/or municipal 
public offices or mandates after Mar/May 1990. 
Reading aid: 75.2 percent of eastern German members of the German Bundestag in the years 
1990-1994 held political offices during the transitional period in the GDR. 
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For this reason, people were now ascending into the political elite who had 
taken at least initial steps towards becoming members of the functional elite in 
the GDR before either voluntarily abandoning their mobility because of the 
increased political commitment it entailed or who found themselves blocked 
because elite positions were vacated so rarely. In most cases, the political activ-
ity of the new eastern German elite from the ranks of public administration and 
parliaments did not begin until the period of upheaval or the first elections in 
the federal states or the Bundestag elections of 1990 (Figure 3). In the chronol-
ogy, there is no detectable return of the old GDR elites, whereas transition 
politicians accounted for the largest share of the political elite until the late 
1990s (Welzel 1997; Edinger 2004; Best and Vogel 2011).  
Thus, the predominant pattern in the transition process was the replacement 
of central power elites coinciding with the ascent of secondary and functional 
elites. Apart from opposition members, and politically unaffiliated and oppor-
tunistic citizens loyal to the system, ‘imports’ from West Germany constituted 
another recruitment pool for the new East German elites. Though their propor-
tion was relatively small among the East German political elite compared to 
other elite segments, influential and visible positions in East Germany, for 
instance that of head of government of some single states (Länder), have often 
been (and continue to be) occupied by West Germans. Between 1990 and 2010 
their share in all acting Länder-governments in East Germany was between 20 
to 30 percent so that through their visibility they have (at least temporarily) 
contributed to a perception of “colonisation” (Best and Vogel 2011). The influx 
of a pool of West German elites facilitated the establishment of institutional 
structures in East Germany without relying on the former elites and their organ-
isational or professional knowledge. What can be noted, particularly with view 
to the high levels of elite continuity in other post-Communist states, is that the 
comprehensive replacement of the top-level elite in the East was not least a 
result of the availability of the West German elite reservoir, a resource that is 
only available in the case of a re-unification of a country (Bürklin and Hoff-
mann-Lange 1999; Best and Vogel 2011).  
4.  Elite Integration in Germany after 1990 
Given that members of parliament represent the main pool of recruitment for 
political elites at the regional and national levels, we can still, more than twenty 
years after re-unification, speak of a convergence of elites and thus of a struc-
tural and normative integration of elites – the few exceptions prove this rule. 
Parliamentary deputies in both East and West Germany hardly differ from one 
another in terms of social background and recruitment patterns. Similarly, few 
differences can be identified with view to their respective political attitudes and 
preferences, while a marked sense of common identity transcending party and 
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regional boundaries can be observed (see Figure 4). Even where differences 
persist, processes of change run somewhat parallel, suggesting similar patterns 
of perception and decision-making processes among East and West German 
elites. This convergence has occurred mainly in the form of adaptation on the 
part of East German parliamentary deputies to more resemble their West Ger-
man colleagues (Best and Vogel 2011, 2012). 
Figure 4: Sense of Belongingness among East and West German Members of 
the Bundestag (MdB) and of the State Parliaments (MdL, MdA) 
(Indicated Chronologically in Percent)  
 
Source: Collaborative Research Centre 580 of the German Scientific Foundation, Project A3, 
“Jena Parliamentary Survey 2003, 2007 and 2010“; Question: “Do you feel a sense of belong-
ingness with fellow Members of Parliament from other parties and parliamentary groups, or do 
you feel no sense of belongingness with them?”, here: yes; N(2003): 943, N(2007): 1201, N 
(2010): 1272. 
 
This convergence and thereby the emergence of a consensually unified repre-
sentational elite could not be anticipated from the outset, as East German elites 
were in all respects new to parliamentary democracy and first had to learn the 
functional requirements of the new institutions. Their experiences in the dis-
tinct social and political order of the GDR constituted a potential obstacle to 
this learning process, thus raising the prospect of dysfunctional patterns of 
opinion formation and behaviour. Simultaneously, around the time of re-
unification economic and social troubles in East Germany were already emerg-
ing; major differences between the attitudes and value systems of East and 
West Germans were becoming visible, and the asymmetric constellation of re-
unification was leading to a widespread sense among East Germans that their 
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experiences, preferences and biographies were depreciated. This raised the 
question as to whether East German elites would harness this conflict potential 
by portraying the East Germans as a disadvantaged social group and establish-
ing themselves as their political representatives, thus turning regional differ-
ences into a political fault line. 
The reasons why elite integration occurred rather than any of these other 
scenarios, include, apart from the already mentioned socio-structural features 
of the GDR’s secondary and functional elites, most particularly the transfer of 
institutions implied in the asymmetric re-unification of the two Germanys 
(Lehmbruch 1993). As a result institutional frameworks became identical for 
elites in both east and west. At the same time, these institutions provided East 
German elites with a sufficient amount of positions and opportunities for par-
ticipation and inclusion. The adoption of West German institutional structures 
and adjustment to the corresponding new requirements, role expectations and 
patterns of behaviour constituted the most promising option for the East Ger-
man representational elite to gain political scopes of action. After all, rejecting 
the transfer of institutions would have entailed a suspension of resource trans-
fers from the west to the east, and thus further uncertainty regarding the stabil-
ity of the new order in the east of Germany – not least of all considering the 
presence of Soviet, or rather Russian, troops until 1994. 
Furthermore, the multi-level federal system contributed significantly to elite 
integration, firstly by creating a multiplicity of offices and mandates and, sec-
ondly because east-west differences play a minor role in regional politics, since 
the single states rather than East Germany represent the primary point of politi-
cal reference. Correspondingly, the integration of elites is even more pro-
nounced at the level of state parliamentary deputies. 
A final relevant factor is the party system, which, following the fusion of the 
bloc parties with their West German counterparts and the citizens’ movements’ 
inclusion in the West German Green Party and the reconstitution of the SPD, 
was very similar to the West German system. One important difference, how-
ever, is that for historical reasons Die Linke has remained far more influential 
in East than in West Germany. During the 1990s, the successor party of the 
SED, the communist “Socialist Unity Party” (then called the Party of Demo-
cratic Socialism, PDS) attempted to establish itself as the representative of East 
German interests and experiences. Yet as a result of the ideological and organi-
sational continuity with the SED, only a certain section of the East German 
population accepted it as a legitimate representative and gave the party its 
electoral support. Nevertheless, the PDS/Die Linke in this way accomplished an 
act of integration and familiarised its followers and members with the princi-
ples and practices of representative democracy. Even so, 25 years after re-
unification Die Linke maintains a kind of semi-distance to the consensually 
unified ‘all-German’ elite (see Figure 4), as debates about its participation in 
government at a national level frequently exceed the boundaries of normal 
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political dispute in that the party’s fundamental legitimacy is repeatedly ques-
tioned by the other major parties. However, the party has since then shifted 
away from the focus on serving as representative of East German particular 
interests, instead seeing itself as a mouthpiece for the reservations of certain 
segments of the (all-) German population vis-à-vis representative democracy. 
As a consequence of the meagre partial representation of East German expe-
riences and interests, the appropriation of West German institutions by elites 
occurred without any substantial political reappraisal of East German experi-
ences and interests, which thus remained confined to a kind of proto-political 
space (Ostalgie, i.e. nostalgia for East Germany). For this reason – and because 
the general population is naturally less involved with political institutions than 
elites – the processes of adaptation and accommodation by East German elites 
were not accompanied by a corresponding shift in the East German population 
as a whole. Hence, one outcome of this successful elite integration is that, even 
today, the distance in attitudes between the ‘all-German’ political elite and the 
eastern German population is greater than that between elites and the general 
population in West Germany. Likewise, acceptance of national institutions and 
corresponding elites is less pronounced among the East Germans. Without the 
partial representation of East German interests by the PDS and now Die Linke, 
however, this distance would be even greater (Best and Vogel 2011, 2012). 
5.  Elite Structures in North and South Korea 
5.1  Social Structure and Elites in North Korea 
The preconditions for elite transition and elite integration as the basis for suc-
cessful re-unification can be found in the structures of the North Korean elite 
and the action options relevant to them. A corresponding analysis of the North 
Korean case should therefore not simply focus on a potential counter-elite, but 
must also look for groups within the ranks of the power- and functional elites 
who may not behave openly as a counter-elite but would be unopposed to re-
unification under certain conditions, or indeed may even act as its bearers. 
An initial inspection of the structures of the North Korean elite ought to take 
into account the distinction between three elite groups made by the North Ko-
rean state itself and adopted by many observers: 1) the descendants of Kim Il 
Sung, 2) the veterans of the struggle for independence against Japan and their 
descendants, including persons who were close to Kim Il Sung politically, and 
3) the ‘heroes,’ who are further divided into the heroes of the Korean War and 
the Heroes of Labour in the construction of socialism. It is unclear whether or 
not their descendants are to be included in the ‘hero’ category as well. 
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Despite various differences and a general vagueness within these catego-
ries,4 they emphasise the fact that genealogy is essential to status assignment in 
North Korea, and moreover is officially legitimated. Correspondingly, inherit-
ing privileges and offices is a widespread practice (Hyeong-Jun 2013). In the 
GDR, on the other hand, although intra-familial status inheritance became 
increasingly prevalent over time, it nevertheless remained ideologically unde-
sirable and was therefore never legitimated, as the effects thereof would have 
called into question elite recruitment based on political loyalty and meritocra-
cy, or more generally the mechanisms of position and status assignment in a 
presumably ‘classless’ society (Best 2012). 
This schema, deployed by the South Korean side as an analytical heuristic, 
emphasises the primacy of politics, because intra-familial, comradely or ideologi-
cal loyalty towards political leaders and the political system are central and thus 
do not indicate any further differentiation of additional recruitment criteria. Fur-
thermore, this categorisation is of an official nature in North Korea, underscoring 
how vital centrally and hierarchically determined political decisions are in the 
shaping of elite status and the allocation of privileges and positions. 
However, a degree of caution must be observed when using this status 
schema to examine the elite structure because, to begin with, in addition to the 
lack of analytically disjunctive separation, we also lack a quantification of 
these groups that goes beyond mere estimates. Furthermore, membership in 
these groups is defined primarily by access to privileges. These privileges, 
                                                             
4  Accordingly, several variants of this typology are known in both North and South Korea. It is 
possible that the criteria are deliberately kept vague so as to allow for individual case-
specific decisions. The prominent position of the anti-Japanese partisans and their descend-
ants, however, can be found in all of the typologies. As an example, here are three such ty-
pologies:  
(EWHA Universität 2013) (Soyoung 2003) (Lee et al. 2013) 
Descendants of Kim Il Sung 1st revolutionary generation (anti-Japanese partisans, born 
before 1920) 
and 2nd revolutionary 
generation (their descend-
ants) 
1st revolutionary generation 
(anti-Japanese partisans) Anti-Japanese partisans 
Heroes of the Korean War 
and of socialist construction  
2nd generation (heroes of the 
Korean War and of socialist 
construction) 
 
1st non-revolutionary 
generation (born before 
1920) 
2nd non-revolutionary 
generation (born after 1920)  
 
3rd generation (born after 
1950) 
3rd generation (no details 
indicated) 
 4th generation (born since 1970)  
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however, do not necessarily translate into political, economic or other forms of 
influence which – particularly in the political arena – are usually secured, in-
cluding in North Korea, through the assumption of formal executive positions, 
especially in the state security service (EWHA Universität 2013, 33). There-
fore, and specifically with a view to the third group, membership tells us very 
little about the respective elite status of a given individual, as this group also 
includes local and regional office holders who could potentially be members of 
the secondary elite and thus potential members of the primary elite – but only 
when given the possibility of advancing to higher positions from that office. 
What the schema does offer, however, especially if we also take the non-
privileged into consideration, is a self-description of the North Korean social 
structure utilising the categories of upper, middle and lower class. Membership 
in one of these socio-structural groups is accompanied by highly unequally 
distributed opportunities for participation and status hierarchies which also find 
expression – even in the case of elites – in sector-specific and positional differ-
ences. Correspondingly, the first group of descendants and relatives of Kim Il 
Sung occupy the central positions in politics, administration, the economy and 
culture. However, due to its naturally small size it is forced to share this privi-
lege with members of the second group. If we compare the first two groups 
with the third group, then, there is a clear asymmetry in status, for the highest 
and most important leading positions – with one exception – are generally 
unachievable for members of the third group due to their familial background, 
while their own position and allocation of privileges always depend on deci-
sions taken by the first and second groups (EWHA Universität 2013, 37). 
Members of the third group essentially represent blocked secondary elites. In 
contrast to the GDR, however, where this blockage was owing to the over-
accumulation of offices and the long sitting periods of the office holders well 
into old age, in North Korea they are blocked primarily by the ascriptive char-
acter of status assignment. 
The only exception that allows for members of the third group to access cen-
tral leading positions and thereby become what could be seen as members of 
the primary elite, is the military. According to South Korean experts, here the 
heroes in fact occupy the majority of leading positions from the officers’ rank 
upwards (EWHA Universität 2013; Hyeong-Jun 2013). 
There exists a tendency for this status assignment along political-ascriptive 
criteria to be challenged by the emergence of a proto-market, a process that can 
be observed since the mid-1990s. After all, the appropriation of private proper-
ty and the accumulation of economic capital may lead to a new channel of 
resources, privileges and influence distribution that is independent of state-
directed allocations, de-centralised and non-hierarchical, i.e. market-based. 
This observation, however, must take into consideration the fact that access to 
those market-like structures has thus far been determined by one’s position 
within the political elite. The notion of a ‘political capitalism’ (Staniszkis, 
HSR 41 (2016) 3  │  351 
Kisiel and Szelenyi 1991) therefore seems to a certain extent applicable to 
North Korea (Hyeong-Jun 2013). 
By the time North Korean foreign trade was established in the 1970s, mem-
bers of the second group were already endowed with certain privileges, as they 
usually led the companies in charge of foreign trade. Following the economic 
collapse in the 1990s and the accompanying famine (‘Arduous March’), it was 
the underclass, i.e. those without any privileges, who were the first to initiate 
barter trade and thereby engage in market-like activities in order to secure their 
livelihood. Subsequently, members of the third group (the ‘heroes’) became 
increasingly active in the emerging markets, an activity which was motivated 
by several factors. Firstly, these market activities became necessary for the 
third group as their privileges could no longer be guaranteed under such bleak 
economic conditions. In spite of their elevated status they found themselves 
directly affected by food shortages, something which did not apply to members 
of the first two groups. In this situation of relative status loss, the asymmetry 
between the distinct elite groupings, or rather between upper and middle clas-
ses, became increasingly visible. Another factor was that the military as an 
institution was itself permitted to a certain extent to engage in market-
economic activities, ensuring its ability to perform regardless of decreases in 
state funding. The military – and thus large sections of the third group – was 
ideally equipped for market-like activities, as it enjoyed access to a sufficiently 
large pool of labour and the extensive transportation capacities required for 
export-oriented market activities while being relatively protected from police 
and state security services. 
In a system in which private property is tolerated but essentially illegal, pro-
tection from state interference is essential to market-economic activities. Each 
shift in the political winds can just as well imply an end to this tolerance. This 
is all the more so given that members of the first two groups, already in the 
1970s (see above) but also more recently, engage in market-economic activities 
as well. Consequently, even though a differentiation of the mechanisms of 
resource and privilege allocation can be observed, political status assignment 
remains a priority. In this sense, the North Korean situation resembles that of 
the GDR in its basic premises, where meritocratic elements also played a role 
in addition to the main criteria of loyalty and conformity, particularly in areas 
distant from the circles of power. However, the sector-specific differentiation 
of recruitment criteria in the GDR was further developed, as formal education 
and professionalism generally became more important factors the greater the 
distance a given area was from the centre of power. 
With view to either a possible transformation of North Korea (a far-reaching 
change of the social structure), a transition (changes to institutional structures), 
or even re-unification, the central question remains whether the third group’s 
access to economic resources and privileges in combination with the top-level 
military positions the members of this group occupy will generate a conflict 
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potential between the first two groups on one side, and this group acting as a 
counter-elite on the other. The answers to this question are rather diverse. 
Speaking for such a conflict potential is the combination of the relative dep-
rivation and inferior positions of members of the third group in most elite sec-
tors, their lack of advancement opportunities into the primary elite, and the 
alternative option of accumulating economic resources, not to mention their 
control over the means of military power. A conflict arises out of this situation 
as soon as the economic options of the third group are curtailed because, for 
instance, the first two groups view themselves as being threatened by market 
structures and the establishment of economic elites, and in turn seek to either 
restrict market-economic activities or appropriate them for their own gains. 
If no such limitation occurs, the outlined constellation suggests a more long-
term transition. The reason for this is that market structures create alternative 
possibilities for the third group to appropriate resources and privileges, while at 
the same time blocking market access for the non-privileged, because of the 
combination of their ascriptive and state-guaranteed status assignment, so that 
the social closure by economic elites is legitimated by the political order. In 
this case the first, second and third groupings would all have an interest in 
preserving the existing political order, at least as long as it continues to secure 
their privileges. In essence, then, the potential for conflict develops once the 
first and second groups extend their access to market-like structures too far. 
Since internal quarrels among North Korean elites tend to be first of all distri-
butional struggles over privileges rather than over political or ideological re-
forms, the third group’s inclination to act as a counter-elite and carrier of polit-
ical reforms is highly questionable. 
With view to a possible re-unification, however, our investigation of German 
re-unification and its conditions and impacts within the elite structure allows for a 
different projection. In the German case, the GDR’s secondary and functional 
elites behaved equally loyally and did not constitute a counter-elite. The prospect 
of re-unification that arose in November 1989 translated into an opportunity to 
thrive in an alternative social and political order for these groups. This alternative 
proved more appealing, as it offered greater opportunities for advancement and 
basic access to resources, while the primacy of political loyalty and conformity 
promised to be less dominant in it. Moreover, the basic functional logic of non-
socialist societies had already been present in the GDR through exchanges with 
Western economies – the extent of which again varied from sector to sector – 
while socio-structural mechanisms of differentiation based on the transmission of 
social and cultural capital within families were already working behind the façade 
of socialist equality. As a result, the residue of identification with the socialist 
social order proved insufficient to counter the centrifugal forces unleashed by the 
prospect of re-unification. This was especially true for the secondary and func-
tional elites of the GDR, whose loyalty was essentially pragmatic and not found-
ed on ideology. If a possible re-unification is tied to a guarantee of privileges, it 
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can be assumed that at least members of the third group would not stand in its 
way, especially since their privileges are not legally codified in North Korea and 
therefore exposed to the uncertainty of shifts in political direction and leadership 
within groups one and two. 
In summary, the socio-structural configuration of North Korean elites is 
characterised by the fact that the upper classes dominate the power elite and the 
primary functional elite (save for the military) simultaneously, while participa-
tion of the middle class, i.e. the third group, is confined to the secondary elite 
and the ongoing development of market structures. In this sense and for the 
most part, no congruence of social status and membership in elite groups can 
be observed among members of the third group. Against this backdrop, the 
current differentiation of status and resource allocation through the establish-
ment of private property and market-like elements changes in particular the 
socio-structurally specific opportunities for accessing economic elite positions. 
5.2  The North Korean Central Committee 
The analysis of the social structure of North Korea’s primary and secondary 
power elites and of groups with potential access to such positions primarily 
serves to identify central socio-structural core groups of the elite and their 
potential counter-elites. The concept of elites commonly applied in the interna-
tional debate, however, is usually defined more narrowly. According to this 
definition, elites are the bearers of central leading positions, capable of regular-
ly and substantially influencing decisions of national significance (Burton and 
Higley 1992). Against this backdrop, processes of internal differentiation 
among elites have been identified as crucial factors in the transformations of 
the Chinese and Soviet systems (Soyoung 2003), and, incidentally, in the pro-
cess of German re-unification (see above). As in the GDR, this differentiation 
encompassed career paths required for recruitment to elite positions and their 
associated characteristics and abilities. Over the course of such a differentia-
tion, which always entails the abandonment of ideological in favour of func-
tional recruitment criteria, elites’ loyalty towards the state socialist system can 
erode. That said, the system can also stabilise itself, as heterogeneous elites 
ensure greater responsivity vis-à-vis social developments and are better suited 
to adequate functional performance. Hence, internal differentiation does not 
necessarily lead to transition or even social transformation. These processes of 
internal differentiation among North Korean elites will be elaborated below. 
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Table 2: Socio-Structural Characteristics of the Members of the Central 
Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea 
 1980 1990 2000 2012 
Size (persons) 145 180 158 124 
Newcomers* 41.1 22.2 13.1 - 
Proportion of women   4.1   5.0   5.7     4 
Average age 57.3 64.6 72.1 - 
Age 
80+   0.0   0.0   2.2   2.6 10.1 12.3 23 32.5 
70-79   6.2   7.0 17.2 19.9 48.7 59.2 21 31.3 
60-69 23.4 26.6 50.6 58.3 19.0 23.1 20 30.1 
under 60 58.6 66.4 16.7 19.2   4.4   5.4   4   6.0 
unknown 11.7  13.3  17.7  33  
Region of 
birth 
Pyongyang (city and 
province) 21.4 28.7 23.9 32.4 23.4 33.0 16 38.5 
Hamgyong 31.0 41.7 28.9 39.6 27.2 38.4 11 26.9 
Others   9.7 12.9 10.0 13.7 11.4 16.2 10 23.1 
Outside of North 
Korea** 12.4 16.8 10.0 13.6   8.9 12.5   3   7.7 
Origin unknown 25.5  26.9  29.1  58  
Higher 
educa-
tion**** 
Mangyongdae 
Revolutionary School 15.9 23.3 18.9 26.1 19.0 26.8 10.5 19 
Kim Il Sung University 31.7 47.4 33.9 46.8 36.1 51.4 12.1 22 
Others 19.3 28.8 18.9 25.8 18.4 26.1 19.4 35 
Abroad (mostly USSR) 50.3 75.3 51.7 71.0 47.5 67.6 13.7 25 
No higher education   5.5   8.2   3.3   4.5   0.0   0.0 - - 
Unknown 33.1  27.2  29.7  44  
Political 
genera-
tion*** 
Anti-Japanese 
partisans and their 
descendants  
52.0 49.4 45.1 
- 1st and 2nd non-
revolutionary genera-
tion 
48.0 50.6 54.9 
Relatives of Kim Il Sung   8.3 10.9 12.0 3.0 
Sector of 
Origin 
Party  33.6 34.9 41.8 
- State bureaucracy 33.6 36.6 24.8 Military 24.2 21.1 23.5 
Society*****   8.6   7.4   9.8 
Source: Authors’ own compilation and calculation based on: Soyoung 2003; Lee et al. 2013. 
The grey italicised columns indicate the respective total percentage based on all members of 
the Central Committee. For reasons of simplicity, percentages were calculated based on those 
members for whom information is available. 
* Newcomers since the last Party Congress, in 1990 since 1985 and in 2000 since 1995,as no  
Party Congress was held from 1980 to 2010.  
** USSR, China, South Korea 
*** Soyoung 2003 
**** For the period between 1980-2000 several educational degrees were counted for each  
person, which does not raise their number to 100. 
***** e.g. youth organisations, trade unions, international friendship associations (Korean- 
Soviet Friendship, etc.), media and the press. 
 
Because the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea is the highest 
body of the most important organisation in North Korea, to which, moreover, 
representatives of the various social sectors such as politics, the economy, the 
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military, etc. are appointed, its members could be considered as part of the 
power elite in the sense described above. In the analysis of the Central Com-
mittee’s socio-structural composition, there are two sources which allow for an 
examination of more long-term developments: Soyoung’s research (2003) 
covers the period from 1980 to 2000 and can be expanded with the study con-
ducted by Lee et al. (2013) up to 2012, that is to say, from the 6th and hitherto 
last Party Congress until the 3rd Party Conference of the Workers’ Party. It 
must be noted, however, that this expansion should be interpreted with a degree 
of caution, due to some data related problems (particularly with regard to the 
data pertaining to 2012) and diverging categorisations. 
A first parallel to the GDR is the development of age patterns. From 1980 to 
2000, the average age in the Central Committee steadily rose from 57.3 to 72.1, 
suggesting a low rate of fluctuation among its members. The equally steadily 
decreasing share of newcomers to the Central Committee, which can be ob-
served at least in the data available until the year 2000, further underscores the 
aspect of over-ageing (‘gerontocracy’). 
If, however, we trust the data for 2012 despite a relatively high rate of miss-
ing information, then some signs of a slight reversal in the trend can be ob-
served. Though the share of the very old cohort (80+) has continued to in-
crease, it has not necessarily done so to the detriment of the ‘young’ cohort of 
60 to 69 year-olds. For the first time the age cohorts are now, with the exception 
of the few under 60-year olds, more or less equally distributed, suggesting that 
the reduction of the Central Committee’s size was accompanied by either the 
(forced) abdication of some members of the older cohort and/or the ascendance 
of some members of the younger cohort (60 to 69 year-olds). Taken together with 
anecdotal reports of massive changes in personnel in favour of younger genera-
tions at the level of secondary power- and functional elites (Lee et al. 2013, 56 
et seq.), a generational transition seems to be occurring, the impact of which 
extends, albeit in mitigated form, into the Central Committee itself. 
Nevertheless, this generational transition in no way alters the fact of male 
numerical dominance. The share of female members of the Central Committee 
continues to be negligible.  
There seem to be some changes concerning the aspect of place of birth, 
however, even though, once again, we must be very careful given the large 
amount of missing data for 2012. The figures still possess a certain plausibility, 
as they in fact continue a trend observed since 1980, namely the decrease in 
numbers Central Committee members born in the region of Hamgyong. The 
disproportionally large share of this region through the 1980s can be explained 
by the fact that it was a centre of anti-Japanese partisan activity; hence the 
veterans thereof belonged to the first revolutionary generation. Therefore, the 
increase in members from the city and province of Pyongyang as well as of the 
remaining provinces signifies a differentiation of regional backgrounds, alt-
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hough a regional asymmetry in recruitment persists, as more than half of the 
Central Committee’s members still come from only two regions.  
Data on the educational background of Central Committee members point to 
several trends. We again must be cautious though, not only because of missing 
data for 2012, but also because in the study by Lee et al. in 2012, in contrast to 
studies from the previous years, multiple educational degrees were not specifi-
cally considered. To begin with there is a constantly high proportion (90 per-
cent) of members with a formal school leaving qualification. Although many of 
these degrees are from the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, which, along 
with some – but not most – of the academic institutions subsumed under ‘oth-
er,’ is actually a party and military school, it nevertheless becomes clear that a 
high level of formal education is an important prerequisite for joining the Cen-
tral Committee. At the same time, the presence of the Mangyongdae Revolu-
tionary School does provide rough estimates of the proportion of members of 
the first two groups, North Korea’s upper classes, given that only members of 
these groups are permitted to attend that institution (Soyoung 2003, 107). Cor-
respondingly, for 2012 we can assume that a minimum of 10 percent of Central 
Committee members belong to these two groups, although the share is likely 
higher if we take figures from previous years into account as well. Moreover, 
the data also indicate a differentiation with regard to formal education, as the 
share of graduates from other academic institutions has risen. In contrast, the 
share of graduates from foreign universities, mainly in the USSR, has de-
creased which, given existing age patterns, cannot be attributed to the Soviet 
Union’s collapse following 1992, for members of at least 60 years of age in 
2012 would have completed their degrees in the early 1970s. 
The data for the period up to the year 2000 relativize at least a few state-
ments by South Korean observers concerning the North’s class structure and 
the mechanisms of status assignment active therein. They indicate that many 
members of the first and second non-revolutionary generations are neither 
related to Kim Il Sung nor participated in revolutionary activities during the 
anti-Japanese partisan war, that is to say, they belong to neither the first nor 
second groups as detailed in the first section. They also do not belong exclu-
sively to the third group of society’s ‘heroes’ (Soyoung 2003, 95). Rather, 
these members owe their upward mobility to a career in the Workers’ Party or 
the state bureaucracy. Evidently, advancing into the Central Committee is also 
possible without meeting the genealogical criteria, for this group constituted 
almost half of the Central Committee’s members during the 1980s, and its 
share had risen even more by the year 2000. Family ties to Kim Il Sung contin-
ue to be an important factor, but one that due to biological realities does not 
and cannot find expression in a higher share of Central Committee members. 
Since 1990 and up to 2000, developments were marked by a rising share of 
Central Committee members emerging out of party careers and – in contrast to 
the USSR and China before their transformation – by a consistently high pro-
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portion of members from the military. A further analysis substantiates this, 
showing that almost half of all newcomers to the Central Committee since 1990 
had completed a military career (Soyoung 2013). 
In summary, we can identify two contradictory developments that occurred 
until the year 2000. On the one hand, the reduction of the Central Committee 
while simultaneously appointing fewer new members, the increased weight of 
party and military backgrounds, as well as the continuing dominance of two 
specific academic institutions, two specific regions and one generation of parti-
san fighters (or rather, their descendants) all suggest a closed power elite within 
the Central Committee, united by their similar backgrounds, experiences and 
shared basic ideological convictions, and increasingly striving for internal 
homogeneity and social closure. We can assume that these developments were 
a reaction to Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, and to the downfall, or radical trans-
formation, of the Soviet Union, the countries of the Eastern Bloc and China, all 
of which were responded to with an increased closeness.  
At the same time, however, we find traces of internal differentiation, for in-
stance with regard to the rising share of members lacking experience in revolu-
tionary partisan warfare. Any statements made about developments up to 2012 
must be cautiously evaluated due to the problematic data available to us. In-
deed, the number of members has been reduced further and the share of higher 
age cohorts has risen markedly. That said, over-ageing has slowed to a certain 
extent. Simultaneously, new institutional and geographical origins of members 
have been established alongside the more traditional ones, suggesting at least 
rudimentary moves towards internal differentiation. 
5.3 Structure and Experiences of South Korean Elites 
A direct comprehensive comparison of North and South Korea is a demanding 
undertaking, due to the distinct structures and institutions of the respective 
political systems, not to mention the difficulties posed by a lack of reliable data 
for North Korea. Nevertheless, we can identify groups of persons – in both a 
socialist, totalitarian, one-party system on the one hand, and a market-
economic, presidential, pluralist democracy on the other – whose position(s) 
allow them to frequently and substantially influence or even make decisions 
with significant national impact. In South Korea, ministers and members of 
parliament, beside the president and her closest staff, are considered to be the 
main decision makers (for an overview on this issue see: Dormels 2006, 43-8). 
The data referred to here encompasses ministers from 1993 to 1998, i.e. under 
the Kim Young-sam presidency (Dormels 2006), and the members of parlia-
ment for the years 2006-7 (TRI 2007). Regardless of all these limitations, the 
juxtaposition of individual characteristics already indicates the contours of 
distinct elite configurations. 
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One feature the South shares with North Korea is the marginal position of 
women, in spite of its higher share among ministers and parliamentary depu-
ties. Although Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the former, autocratic president 
Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), became the first woman elected president in 
South Korea, she nevertheless represents a major exception within the sphere 
of the political elite. 
Table 3: Socio-Structural Characteristics of South Korean (SK) Elites (In Percent) 
 Ministers 
1993-1998 
Deputies 
2006/7 
Size (persons) 100  
Proportion of women    8   9.8 
Average age (in years)   56 52.9 
Age 
80+    0 - 
70-79 (Deputies 65+)    0   8.6 
60-69 (Deputies 55-64) 19.8 29.1 
Under 60 (Deputies under 55) 80.1 62.3 
Age unknown    0 - 
Region of Birth 
Seoul/Kyongggi   20 - 
Kangwon    3 - 
Ch’ungch‘ong   17 - 
Cholla   17 - 
Kyongsang   38 - 
Outside of South Korea    5 - 
Higher education* 
No higher educational degree -   3.2 
Seoul National University   66 - 
Abroad (mostly USA)   53 - 
Sector of origin** 
Politics    15 - 
State bureaucracy   35 - 
Military    8 - 
Society*   42 - 
Member of Christian 
denominations 
(Roman Catholic, 
Protestant) 
 
- 59.9 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Dormels 2006; TRI 2007. 
* Several higher educational degrees were counted per person, as a result of which the total   
number does not amount to 100. 
** here: teaching/research; law, media, the economy, summarised for the purpose of comparison. 
 
A comparable process of over-ageing cannot be identified in South Korea, 
although the average age of parliamentary deputies is roughly seven years 
higher than in corresponding international findings (Best and Cotta 2000). Yet, 
the differences between North and South Korea are much more striking. For 
instance, in South Korea no members of parliament are older than 80, while in 
North Korea this age cohort makes up about one third of comparable social 
groups. This would imply that, in contrast to North Korea, only a precious few 
members of the South Korean political elite can actively recall a unified Korea 
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from personal experience. Instead, most of them were politically socialised 
during a time when the division of the peninsula was already in place. Taking 
into account the experiences of German re-unification, however, it would be 
implausible to view these divergent experiences as a central obstacle to com-
munication or integration as such. 
The regional origins of South Korea’s political elites are more diverse and 
thus more differentiated than in the North, although Kyongsang exhibits a 
privileged position similar to that of Pyongyang. Neither finding is a peculiarity 
of an historical snapshot, but rather can be demonstrated to varying extent in 
almost all South Korean administrations (Dormels 2006, 321 et seq.). We find 
pronounced regional asymmetries in both North and South Korea, suggesting 
similar formation processes of political support: political networks and loyal-
ties continue to be based on regional origins and ties to a significant degree, 
despite the fact that the functional differentiation of an industrial, or – in the 
case of South Korea – rather post-industrial society engenders sector-specific 
relations of dependency. 
The analysis of formal education also points to common areas of experience 
among South Korean elites comparable to those in North Korea: here a similar 
academic institution, Seoul National University, is attended by half of the politi-
cal elite. However, studies abroad are more frequent not only with regard to 
extent but also to the diversity of destination countries. While North Korea’s 
elites nearly exclusively studied in the USSR, albeit decreasingly so, about half of 
South Korean government ministers earned their academic degree in the USA. 
Sectoral origin of elites, then, clearly reflects differences between the two 
societies. Although up until the 1980s an almost identical share of elites in both 
Koreas had previously pursued a career in the state bureaucracy, in North Ko-
rea this share subsequently dropped significantly. Today, the dominance of 
party and the military and the simultaneous lack of experience in the civil sec-
tor characterises North Korean elites, while in South Korea elites from the civil 
sector dominate, and military or other elites with a markedly political back-
ground have comparatively little weight. 
One rather important factor in the successful integration of East and West 
German elites was the confessional structure: compared to the general popula-
tion in the east, the share of denominationally affiliated Christian representa-
tional elites was much higher (with the exception of Die Linke), marking an 
important similarity to West German representational elites. These shared 
experiences and mindsets were suited to facilitate mutual rapprochement on a 
pre-political basis (see above). This advantage cannot be utilised for any possi-
ble agreements between North and South Korean elites: while at least 59.9 
percent of South Korean members of parliament are affiliated to one of the 
Christian denominations – a much larger share than among the general popula-
tion – this possibility can be entirely ruled out for North Korean elites. 
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The conclusions from this partial comparison must be stated with caution. It 
seems safe to say that North and South Korean elites exhibit marked differences 
in their respective socio-structural composition, which reveals diametrically 
opposed recruitment criteria. However, there are also similarities suggesting 
social and cultural commonalities dating back to long before Korea was divided. 
These include the significance of regional asymmetries and the role of common 
regional origins, reflected in both states by the privileged status of certain re-
gions. As well there is the dominance of particular educational institutions which 
in turn point to the significance of shared spaces of experience. Nevertheless, the 
integrational potential of these commonalities must be assessed with a degree of 
scepticism, as elites in both countries share no common areas of experience, but 
instead are simply confronted with similar – because universal – logics of elite 
recruitment. These logics may have similar effects in both states and pose a num-
ber of similar challenges to both South and North Korean elites, but they do not 
unfold any real potential for integration. This is not least of all due to the fact that 
the common features identified, at least in the case of North Korea, clearly repre-
sent secondary elements of the opportunity structure. 
Aside from structural characteristics, we must also take into account South 
Korean elites’ experiences. One of the central ones that might influence South 
Korean elites’ approach to North Korean elites is the elite settlement of 1987, 
as a result of which military rule was ended and the transition towards a demo-
cratic state order was implemented largely peacefully, while the once divided 
South Korean elite was transformed into a consensually unified elite (Burton 
and Ryu 1997).5 The heart of this elite settlement was an agreement between 
the previously antagonistic elites on a democratic constitution in the framework 
of which the acquisition and passing on of government power would be deter-
mined exclusively by free elections with opposition participation. Through 
their approval of the draft constitution on 31 August 1987, the military elites 
headed by Chun Woo Wan and Roh Tae Woo handed over their control of 
government to the civil institutions of parliament and president. General Roh 
Tae Woo, who then won the presidential elections in 1987 after the opposition 
fielded two competing candidates, took no steps to reverse any of the new 
constitution’s provisions. This support for the new political order emphasises 
that the erstwhile opponents were able to mutually accept one another and 
agree that compromise and concession would be the central instruments of 
politics in the future. Such a successful elite settlement, its subsequent stabilisa-
tion and the emergence of a consensually unified elite entails a host of precon-
ditions. The military elites’ willingness to make concessions had steadily risen 
in the period prior to the elite settlement. One of the underlying reasons for this 
was how the opposition demonstrated its remarkable mobilising capacities not 
                                                             
5  The depiction of developments in South Korea until the mid-1990s is based on Burton and 
Ryu (1997). 
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only in the form of mass protests and strikes, but also in the general elections of 
1985, in which the oppositional New Democratic Party was able to gain a sig-
nificant number of seats in its first time standing candidates. Simultaneously, 
the USA demanded more willingness to make concessions on the part of the 
military elites, while economic elites no longer supported the repression of 
democratic activities, as they now viewed it as an obstacle to the pursuit of 
their interests. In this situation, reformers within the military elite won the 
upper hand and advocated for concessions.  
An important component of this trajectory was the assurance to Chun Doo 
Wan that no criminal investigation against him or his colleagues for their sei-
zure of power or the Gwangju massacre would be filed – although this occurred 
in the end. At the same time, opposition elites were also prepared to withdraw 
their insistence on their maximum demands (investigation of the Gwangju 
massacre, creating the post of vice-president and profit sharing for workers) as 
a condition for passing the draft constitution of 31 August 1987. Two further 
events were also helpful in consolidating a consensually unified elite, signal-
ling to the erstwhile autocratic ruling elite that politicians in the new democrat-
ic order would not act against the former’s fundamental interests: correspond-
ingly, the first president Roh Tae Woo was not a candidate of the opposition, 
and the two most important opposition parties under Kim Young-sam and Kim 
Jong-pil merged with Roh Tae Woo’s party, thus consolidating power sharing 
at an organisational level as well. Under the presidency of Kim Young-sam, 
charges were brought against Chun Doo Wan, Roh Tae Woo and other former 
rulers relating to their seizure of power and the Gwangju massacre, but even 
after Chun Doo Wan was sentenced to death and other defendants given 
lengthy prison sentences, military elites showed little inclination to intervene 
against these punishments. The fact that the main defendants were later par-
doned may be seen as a further component of the elite settlement. 
At first glimpse, the positive experience of this elite settlement may be use-
ful in managing re-unification via an understanding between and integration of 
North and South Korean elites, as it would entail rapprochement between two 
previously hostile elite groupings. However, one precondition for this would be 
a stable and effective elite consensus on the South Korean side, since only a 
lasting and consistently positive experience can ensure other elite groups’ 
openness to integration. Against this backdrop, we must finally incorporate the 
assessment by members of the South Korean National assembly as recorded in 
a survey conducted in 2006-7 (TRI 2007). These findings suggest several prob-
lems within the elite consensus, even though the data concern mainly political 
elites organised in political parties and cannot necessarily be seamlessly trans-
ferred to relations between elites from distinct respective sectors.  
When asked how or to what extent parties sought compromise in parliament, a 
total of 81.9 percent of legislators responded that willingness to compromise was 
‘bad’ or ‘very bad.’ The mean value of 1.97 on a scale ranging from 1 ‘very bad’ 
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to 4 ‘very good’ is by far the lowest when compared to other transformation 
countries such as Chile (2.38), Poland (2.48) and South Africa (2.76). 
According to the perception of interviewed legislators, the integration of 
elites through common and cross-party communication networks is very poorly 
developed: when asked about the quality of communication between govern-
ment and opposition, three quarters of deputies described it as being of bad or 
even very bad quality. However, the mean value of 2.18 on a scale from 1 to 4 
(see above) is more or less average if we once again compare it to similar coun-
tries (Chile: 2.07, Poland: 2.00, South Africa: 2.77). 
A similar pattern can be observed regarding the statement that competition 
among political parties never leads to violent conflict. This statement is only 
confirmed by 34.7 percent of interviewed legislators (‘I strongly agree’ and ‘I 
tend to agree’), while almost 40 percent remain undecided and about one quarter 
reject the statement. Although the mean value of 2.92 on a scale ranging from 1 
‘strongly agree’ to 5 ‘strongly disagree’ is not particularly pronounced in compar-
ison with similar countries in transformation (Chile: 2.70, Poland: 3.43, South 
Africa: 2.85), at least two thirds of interviewees cannot rule out that conflicts 
between parties may become violent at some point in the future. In summary, the 
findings suggest that the elite consensus in South Korea is not entirely solid, and 
would have to be tested for its stability in the case of rapprochement or agree-
ments either with current or transformed North Korean elites.  
6.  Implications 
The experience of peaceful German re-unification as well as the peaceful trans-
formation of South Korea demonstrates that elite agreements are a necessary 
prerequisite to the establishment of a stable and pacified political order. Conse-
quently, the new elite paradigm can certainly be applied to the Korean peninsu-
la where currently two political and social systems built on diametrically op-
posed basic principles face each another in an ongoing hostile confrontation. 
However, a direct transfer of the German experience onto Korea is essentially 
precluded due to the distinct historical preconditions and trajectories of the two 
countries. The prehistory of the Korean War – a brutal civil war costing hun-
dreds of thousands of lives, the hermetic closure of both Korean sub-societies 
between which no social and (in comparison to the German case) very little 
economic exchange occurs, as well as North Korea’s potential to threaten and 
blackmail owing to its nuclear armament – all suggest that the premises for an 
‘all-Korean’ elite agreement and an elite settlement conducive to political re-
unification on the Korean peninsula are rather bleak. 
On the other hand, elites on both sides share a common Korean history unen-
cumbered by historical guilt, as well as a grand cultural history marked by major 
achievements. Simultaneously, the regionalism and embryonic beginnings of de-
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centralisation (even in North Korea) represent secondary structural elements that 
may be suited to institutionally support national integration. A process of national 
integration in Korea could base itself on these common national traits. In order to 
set such a process in motion, however, a convergence of interests between North 
and South Korean elites would have to be found that extends beyond the mobili-
sation of national sentiment and drives forward antagonistic cooperation. For 
North Korean elites, this may include expanded opportunities for economic ap-
propriation and a significant improvement in their quality of life, all of which 
would likely result from closer cooperation with South Korea. Economic func-
tional elites, i.e. individuals belonging to the third elite group would probably be 
the main beneficiaries of such a cooperation,. This elite group, along with mem-
bers of the state administration, would also benefit from institutional protection 
and legally codified guarantees in a transfer of elements of a functioning legal 
state to North Korea. To qualify this statement, however, it should be added that 
economic privileges in currently developing North Korean political proto-
capitalism are limited and not guaranteed by legal security. Nevertheless, over the 
course of rapprochement – or even re-unification – possibilities to push competi-
tors off the market through political interventions would diminish, even though 
opportunities for appropriation as a whole may expand. Consequently, not every 
form of rapprochement would prove equally appealing to members of the third 
group. Another problematic aspect is that economic privileges and legal guaran-
tees are not or not equally relevant to top-level North Korean political staff, i.e. 
for members of the first and second groups, since hereditary and loyalty-based 
criteria for access to the highest elite segments would most likely proportionally 
decrease in relative importance. 
For South Korean elites, the crucial gain from an elite agreement would be 
the achievement of national unity and sovereignty as well as a reduction of 
political tensions and the threat of war. For Korean elites as a whole, an elite 
agreement would imply a significant gain in sovereignty, entailing more inde-
pendence from their geopolitical patrons, the USA and the People’s Republic 
of China, respectively. The elaboration of a common Korean agenda, i.e. the 
identification of common goals and concerns, would represent the first step 
towards an elite agreement on the Korean peninsula. It would have to be fol-
lowed up by the establishment and institutional protection of special fora for 
elite cooperation and conflict management. The goal would has to be the initia-
tion and consolidation of social and economic points of contact, which in turn 
may lead to an autocatalytic process in which expanded elite cooperation and 
institutional structures of a Korean confederation begin to emerge, in pursuit of 
re-unification as a long-term goal. 
Considering the totalitarian and human rights-violating character of North 
Korean elites, however, these functional deliberations aimed primarily at na-
tional integration inevitably raise questions of justice and acceptance. That 
said, any alternative option to that of elite cooperation and integration would 
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likewise entail problems of acceptance and legitimacy. A complete replacement 
of North Korean by South Korean elites, which could only occur in the wake of 
a collapse of the North Korean regime, could be perceived as colonisation by 
the North Korean population and could reinforce or even serve as an additional 
impetus for the creation of a separate or separatist North Korean identity. One 
alternative could be the appointment of non-elites distanced from official poli-
tics and hence with little experience in leading positions in North Korea. How-
ever, this would almost certainly be accompanied by problems of output legit-
imacy, for it would imply a complete disregard for the expert knowledge and 
experience of North Korean functionaries. Against this backdrop, we must keep 
in mind that in East Germany the central power elites were replaced by rela-
tively untainted secondary elites during the GDR’s last year of existence. That 
is to say, the fact that German re-unification occurred after a democratic trans-
formation including an exchange of elites had already taken place (albeit forced 
by West Germany) represents a critical factor in successful elite integration and 
thus national integration. 
Nevertheless, elite integration has led to a far more pronounced gulf be-
tween the population and political elites in the east than exists in the west, and 
continues to contribute to a de-legitimisation of established political personnel 
in the eyes of the East German population and to the latter turning away from 
democratic institutions.  
Another possibility in a re-unified Korea could be that sections of the politi-
cal elite politicise old or newly emerging regional differences between North 
and South. The less they are de-legitimised in the eyes of the North Korean 
population, the more successful they would be in endangering national integra-
tion. Should, however, these political elites be provided with incentives to 
integrate into the all-Korean power and institutional framework, then the trans-
formation of regional differences into political fault lines seems unlikely. Hav-
ing said that, the specific interests of the North Korean population may go 
without institutional representation in such a scenario, which would at least 
retain the possibility of a counter-elite establishing itself as representatives of 
the North Korean population. Yet if such a politicisation of North Korean in-
terests and experiences does not occur, then growing dissatisfaction could lead 
to a lack of support for and acceptance of the institutions and actors of the re-
unified nation state on the part of the North Korean population.  
Given the uncertain nature of future developments on the Korean peninsula, 
the German experience offers no precise answers as to what could be an opti-
mal balance between elite replacement, elite continuity and elite import or 
between the integration of regional sub-elites and the representation of the 
highly divergent experiences and interests of North and South Korea, nor is it 
possible to say what combination of transformation and re-unification may 
evolve on the peninsula. What the findings concerning the German case do 
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suggest, however, is that a balance of the various options may in fact help 
mitigate their respective negative side-effects. 
Two conclusions arise regarding the theorems of the ‘new elite paradigm.’ 
On the one hand, the preconditions for the genesis of elite integration must be 
investigated more closely. In this sense, antagonistic cooperation does not 
require a consensus with respect to the rules of access to and distribution of 
power in an existing or future political system, but can nevertheless imply 
cooperation between elites who otherwise stand in antagonistic opposition to 
one another. The preconditions for this are the stability of the status quo and 
parity between elites involved. Proceeding from this basis, cooperation guided 
by the pursuit of perhaps not common, but at least not diametrically opposed 
interests, can potentially develop. Should such a cooperation repeatedly prove 
successful, a level of reciprocal trust is then established which in turn perpetu-
ates and sustains this cooperation. Antagonistic cooperation can thus function 
as a precursor to a consensually unified elite, although it tends also to effect a 
stabilisation of the status quo, thereby preventing further elite integration.  
A further aspect in need of closer examination, apart from the relationships 
between elites, concerns the consequences of elite integration for relations 
between sub-elites and their constituent population groups. Asymmetry in the 
pace of elite integration and that of the general population can engender an 
alienation between elites and segments of the population, which in turn is dys-
functional for processes of national integration. As a consequence, although 
elite integration by all means represents a necessary condition for national 
integration, it is certainly not a sufficient one. 
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